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ABSTRACT
In less than 50 years China has grown from a poor country to a global power. Export of goods to 
the developed markets of the West and the insistence on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-ex-
istence have elevated China to the second largest economy in the world. China’s development 
plans function on a basis of a two-way road and the principle behind it is pretty straightforward, 
energy import and goods export. The scale of diplomatic efforts to strengthen China’s relation-
ships with Asian, African and European countries brings astounding results almost on a daily 
basis. The Chinese mobile providers in Africa had 475 million users in 2013 and the total trade 
between China and Africa from rose to US$198.49 billion by 2012. Chinese success stories are 
not too different in Asia and Europe, where they invest billions of dollars in various infrastruc-
ture projects. In March 2016, China came up with its most ambitious project, outlining a $50 
trillion plan to create a world electricity network that heavily incorporates wind energy from the 
Arctic and solar energy from the Equator regions. As the report states, the project could come 
on line by 2050, but the State Grid wants to begin pilot projects within the next 10 years. This 
paper analyzes the complexity and multidimensionality of the Chinese plans within and outside 
the scope of the One Belt, One Road initiative and makes an attempt at predicting one of the 
possible outcomes of the Chinese plans.
Keywords: One Belt, Silk Road, Five Principles of Co-existence, Security, Trade, Asia, Africa, 
Europe. 
INTRODUCTION
In less than 50 years China has grown from a poor country 
to a global power. Export of goods to the developed markets of 
the West and the insistence on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence1 have elevated China to the second largest eco-
nomy in the world. Four of the five largest banks in the world 
today are Chinese and it is no wonder that China on average 
invests more than a billion dollars per country, which by all 
means represents a very serious investment, especially in case 
of undeveloped and third-world countries. 
1  Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were originally enumerated by the Chinese 
leadership in 1954: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (changed 
to mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at the Asian-African Con-
ference), mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit (changed to equality and mutual benefit in the Sino-Indian joint Statement and 
Sino-Burmese Joint Statement), and peaceful co-existence (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_ 665547/ t18053.shtml).
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Put simply, China’s development plans function on a basis of a two-
way road and the principle behind it is pretty simple, energy import and 
goods export. As Payne (2016) puts it, “the oil will continue to flow 
east and goods will continue to ship west” (p. 2).  However, the imple-
mentation of such a plan requires unprecedented efforts and a long-term 
planning. Although the current Chinese development plans are often 
called ‘Silk Road’ and perceived as an equivalent of the ancient Silk 
Road, the following chapters will show that the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of these plans are way beyond the scope of the ancient 
Silk Road and, besides establishing the economic belt and diversify-
ing energy supplies, Chinese projects also include investments in many 
other areas.2
Chinese initiatives in the field of energy over the past few years have 
been astounding. The scale of diplomatic efforts to strengthen China’s 
relationships with Asian, African and European countries brings res-
ults almost on a daily basis. Over the past few years fifty-three African 
countries have been given various economic grants, interest-free loans 
and preferential loans by China and it seems that there is much more 
to come. The Chinese investment efforts in Central Asia and Asia in 
general are comparable to those in Africa and they also include renew-
able energy, natural gas and nuclear energy projects. As a result, not 
only that China is perceived as an ‘energy intruder’ into the Central 
Asian countries by Russia (Eder, 2014) but also as a rising power that 
is slowly taking over the African continent. Therefore, it is no wonder 
that China’s concerns related with the stability and security of the in-
ternational supplies is often characterized as an “obsession with the oil 
problem” (Kambra & Howe 2007, p. 121). 
Following the Chinese oil imports it becomes obvious that coun-
tries from which China imports oil are pretty much in line with the 
One Belt, One Road initiative. In addition, Chinese efforts to secure oil 
imports and other energy resources extend over the boundaries of the 
One Belt, One Road initiative and scratching the surface of the Chinese 
development in Asia, Middle East and Africa, it becomes evident that 
there is actually much more than meets the eye. China is not only de-
veloping and diversifying its oil and gas imports and securing economic 
routes but also investing in many other projects that are not directly 
related with energy or the OBOR initiative. Therefore, we may rightly 
ask whether the Chinese energy security projects, combined with the 
OBOR initiative, are enough to justify trillions of dollars China is in-
2  University exchange, oil, gas, electricity, police training, military co-operation and base (Djibouti), 
ports, railroads, highways, education, culture, agriculture, renewable sources of energy, economy (Suez 
Canal, etc.), transport, water, healthcare, common identity, mining, telecommunications, construction, tour-
ism, technology, environment, etc.
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vesting in various projects around the world. 
The official Beijing has been promoting its projects as economic 
and trade initiatives but as the Chinese projects are progressing it is be-
coming more obvious that Beijing is also trying to achieve other goals, 
such as general security (e.g. control over Xinjiang province) and its 
long-term geostrategic objectives. 
This paper analyzes Chinese demand for oil and the development of 
the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative announced by the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in 2013. Other Chinese initiatives around the 
world will be touched upon as well. The aim of the analysis is to an-
swer several questions: What is actually the OBOR initiative and how 
is it connected with the energy security? Why does China need such 
an extensive network of ports, roads, railways and energy networks in 
(inland) Asia, Africa and Europe? How are education, healthcare, cul-
ture promotion, railway and road construction in Africa connected with 
the Chinese energy security and economy? Does China really need to 
include almost every country in Asia and Africa in its project in order to 
secure its energy supplies and economy? Are these two plans – Chinese 
oil imports security and diversification and OBOR initiative - besides 
being economic and energy security plans - also a silent takeover of the 
leadership position from the US? What is the grand strategy behind the 
Chinese plans?
CHINA’S OIL AND GAS DEMAND AND IMPORTS
Crowded streets, people honking the horns, long traffic jams, black-
outs and constant obsession with energy security are frequent concerns 
in China. Only 20 years ago this picture was very different. In the 
1990s China’s per capita consumption of petroleum was at about 170 
kg, which was around 10% of the level in advanced economies (Kam-
bara & Howe, 2007). However, according to Hurst’s (2006) prediction, 
China will have 120 million private cars by 2020, which will increase 
the demand for oil to 14.2 million bpd3 by 2025 and according to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2035 China will probably have 
360 million passenger vehicles (Preston, 2011). Therefore, China will 
be facing severe energy shortages if considerable supplies and new en-
ergy sources are not secured. Furthermore, due to 9.85% GDP annual 
growth rate from 1989 until 2016 (Husna, 2016), China is already not 
able to meet its own needs through its domestic production of energy 
and it is anticipated that by 2030 China will be importing about 85% of 
its oil (Preston, 2011). This pace of growth in the demand for energy, 
China’s urbanization and economic rebalancing have set China on a 
3  Barrels per day
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road of urgent expansion of energy resources abroad, which will have 
substantial consequences for the world’s energy markets (Poorsafar, 
2013) and, according to British Petroleum (BP), China will account for 
25% of growth in total energy demand through 2030 (Poorsafar, 2013). 
This rise in the demand for energy is mostly caused by the Chinese 
economic development plans. Namely, since the 1990s China has been 
focused heavily on its economic growth and the energy drives that 
growth. As previously mentioned, China’s development plans function 
on a basis of a two-way road and the principle behind it is pretty simple, 
energy import and goods export. China has been striving to ensure that 
its energy sources are not interrupted in the future, as energy security is 
critical to its growth (Hurst, 2006). The energy security issue, although 
as a term used since the 1990s, was actually prioritized in the 2000s and 
in 2003 a “going global” strategy to address this issue became one of 
the top Chinese priorities (Lee, 2012). The issue started as a solution 
to the energy and economic issues, but China’s approach to its energy 
security needs is rather strategic and it includes financial, political and 
diplomatic support to national oil companies to secure foreign supplies 
for domestic use (Lee, 2012). 
Of the world’s estimated 1.3 trillion barrels of proven oil reserves, 
more than half are in the Middle East, with Latin America and North 
America next in line. Major Middle Eastern oil exporters are Saudi Ar-
abia, Kuwait and Iraq (Lee, 2012) and until 2003 China was importing 
majority of its oil from the Middle East. Then, due to instability of the 
region, China shortly shifted the focus on other parts of the world such 
as Caspian, Russia, the Americas, the East and South China Sea and 
Africa (Hurst, 2006). 
In 2004 China also started intensifying its diplomatic visits to African 
nations in order to set the stage for future energy projects (Hurst, 2006). 
Over the past decade China established close diplomatic relations with 
Africa, giving 53 countries various economic grants, interest-free loans 
and preferential loans, which resulted in 701.000 bpd imports in 2005, 
that is, 30% of total Chinese imports came from Africa (Hurst, 2006). 
China also concluded significant agreements on oil imports from Ni-
geria and Angola and in 2006 these two countries were already supply-
ing China with as much oil as Saudi Arabia (Hurst, 2006).
Since the discovery of large oil and gas deposits, the Caspian re-
gion has also been attracting more international attention. Over the next 
20 years global oil exports from this region will rise to 9% and gas 
exports to 11% (Romanowski, 2014). Another Central Asian country, 
Kazakhstan, has already become one of the most important Chinese 
oil suppliers and in 2014 Turkmenistan, with the largest gas deposits 
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in Central Asia, was one of the main Chinese suppliers (Romanowski, 
2014). According to the current plans, China expects to import up to 
65 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan on an annual 
basis by 2020 and in 2013 China signed an agreement to import up to 10 
billion cubic meters of natural gas from Uzbekistan (China’s Ambitions 
in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 2, 2013). 
In 2014, China also concluded a $400 billion gas deal with Russia 
(Romanowski, 2014). However, due to the global political trends the 
situation regarding oil imports from Russia is a different story. Although 
China has for long been importing oil from Russia, a new pipeline (1 
million bpd) agreed by both countries will probably not be completed 
by the end of the decade (Hurst, 2006). Moscow’s plan to maximize 
profits in prolonged negotiations and fear of China’s rise combined with 
the role that energy exports could play in Russian foreign policy and 
domestic politics seem to be an insurmountable obstacle at the moment 
(Eder, 2014).
Recognizing the importance of the diversification of its oil imports, 
China temporarily froze its efforts in Russia and started establishing 
closer relations with other suppliers. Figures from 2010 show that 23% 
of China’s offshore equity oil production was in Kazakhstan, 15% in Su-
dan and Venezuela, 14% in Angola, 5% in Syria, 4% in Russia, and 3% 
in Tunisia, while the remaining 20% was in Nigeria, Indonesia, Peru, 
Ecuador, Oman, Columbia, Canada, Yemen, Cameroon, Gabon, Iraq, 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan (Lee, 2012). However, in 2014 together 
with Saudi Arabia and Angola, Russia was again among the top Chinese 
oil suppliers. In the same year 30% of natural gas came to China from 
foreign sources, while in 2015, Saudi Arabia was still China’s largest 
supplier of crude oil (Daniels & Brown, 2015).
Another issue related with the energy security is the pollution of en-
vironment. Beijing has for long been one of the most polluted cities in 
the world and this pollution is mostly caused by the coal-based energy 
production. In order to reduce reliance on coal, the Chinese set a goal of 
raising the percentage of the total energy mix supplied by clean energy 
to 15% by 2020, while in 2014 Beijing announced a plan to have 20% 
of its total energy come from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030, 10% from 
natural gas by 2020, as well as the reduction of coal energy to 62% and 
expansion of nuclear energy production by 2020 (Tiezzi, 2014c). Ac-
cording to the announced plan, China will be producing 85% of its total 
energy by 2020 and, together with all the other projects, the deep-wa-
ter drilling in the South China Sea will be intensified (Tiezzi, 2014c). 
In comparison with the above-mentioned predictions from 2011 that 
China will be importing 85% of its oil by 2030, this plan might be a bit 
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surprising and the announced reduction in coal consumption means that 
China will have to find and secure other sources of energy. 
On the other hand, it is already known that clean energy sources will 
probably not be enough to satisfy Chinese demands, which means that 
China will have to strengthen its diplomatic relations with new energy 
partners in order to secure crude oil and gas imports. Beijing is aware 
of this issue and the Chinese diplomats have for long been very active 
in their international efforts to establish close diplomatic relations with 
many countries around the world. Therefore, Beijing’s investments in 
over 50 African countries are not at all surprising. 
However, international concerns regarding the Chinese economic 
and energy security plans cause a lot of controversy in the international 
community. There is a growing distrust that the Chinese economic ef-
forts are actually much wider geo-strategic plans to establish the dom-
inant diplomatic position in many regions of the world. Taking into 
account Russian fears regarding the Chinese geo-strategic rise, it is also 
worth mentioning here that, due to Beijing’s efforts to establish a polit-
ical route for its NOCs with host governments, suspicions that energy 
security is just a sub-component of a broader Chinese geo-strategy is 
additionally fueled and a fear that the Chinese upstream acquisitions 
can lock up oil supplies and distort international oil markets to the det-
riment of other economies is already present at the international level 
(Lee, 2012).
PROJECTS ALONG THE ONE BELT, ONE ROAD INITIATIVE
The Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative, also known as the Silk 
Road Economic Belt, announced in 2013 is probably the most extensive 
project of the 21st century. The OBOR project is often described as the 
most significant initiative that China has ever undertaken. This initiat-
ive includes five major goals: policy coordination, facilities connectiv-
ity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people to people bonds 
(Winter, 2016). As Junjie (2015) says, the Silk Road is more of a net-
work than it is a fixed route that makes its way through the continental. 
In this sense, Beijing is promoting the OBOR initiative economically, 
politically, militarily and culturally and it has become China’s major 
foreign policy goal (Li & Yanzhuo, 2015). Want China Times estimated 
the total value of the Silk Road Economic Belt at $21.1 trillion and a 
new version of the projects reveals many new connecting points in-
cluding Moscow, Russia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Jakarta, Indonesia; and 
Colombo, Sri Lanka (Tiezzi, 2014c). 
As Rudolf claims, the OBOR initiative is Xi Jinping’s major project 
and he promotes it on every state visit. This initiative is intended to cre-
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ate infrastructure networks and expand China’s economic and political 
influence in Eurasia (Rudolf, 2015). As initially presented, China’s new 
Silk Road was supposed to stretch over land from East Asia to west-
ern Europe and include sea routes from the Chinese port of Fuzhou to 
Jakarta, Kalkuta and Colombo in Asia to Nairobi in Africa and Athens 
and Venice in Europe. However, African continent is becoming increas-
ingly involved in this initiative. 
During Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to Africa in 2014, he visited 
Kenya and spoke about China’s plan to build a $3.8 billion railroad link-
ing Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, to Mombasa, a port on the Indian Ocean in 
order to connect Nairobi to the maritime trading route (Tiezzi, 2015c). 
Tiezzi points out that this project is supposed to eventually connect 
Nairobi with the capitals of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan 
and that the Chinese Minister also added that China was ready to help 
Africa link all its capitals by high-speed railways and then to connect 
all of Africa to China’s Silk Road vision. Besides this railroad network, 
China is also developing ports in Djibouti, Tanzania, and Mozambique 
and, according to a Bloomberg report citing the Namibian Times, China 
is also considering ports in Madagascar and the Seychelles (Tiezzi, 
2015c). In 2015, China also made an agreement with Thailand to invest 
in developing 12 ports – including seven African ports (in Djibouti, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, and Tunisia), and 
China has already invested in other infrastructure development projects 
in Africa, constructing roads, railways, and public buildings (Tiezzi, 
2015c).
Besides infrastructure, China Daily predicted increased co-opera-
tion in the sectors of industry, agriculture, mining, finances, telecom-
munications and services (Tiezzi, 2014a). Mushahid Hussain, chairman 
of the Pakistan-China Institute, explained that the economic corridor 
is crucial for the integration of the ‘Greater South Asia’ and that it 
includes China, Iran, Afghanistan and stretches to Myanmar (Tiezzi, 
2014a). Yale (2015) also indicates that the OBOR initiative is inten-
ded to serve diplomatic, economic, and strategic purposes, as well as, 
through economic incentives, to cement relationships with countries 
that are friendly to China such as Malaysia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and 
Pakistan. In this sense, the Maritime Silk Road represents part of a his-
torical continuum, which has been referred to by some as a ‘String of 
Pearls’ policy (Yale, 2015). 
Yale (2015) also says that, in order to predict what projects China is 
likely to fund in the future, it is necessary to look at some of the Chinese 
investments in the past: oil and natural gas links to Myanmar’s port 
in Sittwe, Hambantota and Colombo Port City projects in Sri Lanka, 
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and Gwadar port in Pakistan. Malaysia and China, which is already the 
largest trading partner for most countries in Southeast and South Asia, 
announced a joint port project in Malacca. 
When it comes to the Chinese initiatives in Europe, it is signific-
ant to mentioned Xi Jinping’s visit from 2014. The Chinese president 
visited the Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium and urged the 
EU and China to combine EU policies with China’s OBOR initiative 
(Tiezzi, 2015d). As Tiezzi emphasizes, Hungary was already the first 
EU member state to sign a memorandum of understanding with China 
in 2015 and after this MoU, Russia and Belarus also agreed to work 
with China on the OBOR project (Tiezzi, 2015d). By 2015, Chinese 
companies invested more than $5 billion in CEE countries in sectors 
of energy, infrastructure and machinery and in the coming years China 
will build a high-speed railway between Hungary and Serbia and con-
struct two nuclear reactors at a Romanian nuclear power plant (Tiezzi, 
2015d). 
In an interview from April 2016 Bakir Izetbegović, President of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), supported the OBOR initiative and 
said that BiH is ready for closer relations with China in the area of 
energy, infrastructure, culture and tourism (Izetbegović dao intervju 
kineskoj agenciji Xinhua: Kina je dobrodošla da učestvuje u razvoju 
BiH, 2016) and in May 2016 Chen Bo, Chinese Ambassador to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, confirmed the Chinese interests to invest in Bosnia 
and added that Beijing is mostly interested in energy, infrastructure, 
forestry and agriculture (Maslo, 2016). Over the next few years China 
is planning to invest over €3 billion in energy projects in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and similar projects are planned in Croatia, Kosovo and 
Montenegro (A.C., 2016). 
China also wants to connect all the countries along the OBOR 
routes by a complex network of roads, rails and pipelines (Sellier, 
2016). Beijing promised to invest $1.4 billion in port infrastructure in 
Sri Lanka, $50 billion in infrastructure and energy deals in Central Asia, 
$327 million in general aid in Afghanistan (railways, highways, water 
conservancies, power facilities, etc.) (Tiezzi, 2014c). According to Sel-
lier (2016), the new ports built in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Kenya, spreading from the coast of mainland China through the South 
China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and into the 
Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf provide a basis for the construction of 
new railways that extend from these ports into the interior of the host 
countries. 
China also bought Piraeus port in Greece in 2016. This port will 
serve the same purpose and it will be a basis for developing infrastruc-
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ture from Athens to the Balkans and Central Europe. Chinese banks 
gave considerable loans for Greek ship-owners who agreed to build 
their new ships in China, while other collaborations include naval re-
search and development programs between the universities of the two 
countries (Atzori, 2016).
In 2016, China signed investment and aid deals worth billions of 
dollars with Egypt and outlined multi-billion-dollar investment plans 
for the wider Middle East. According to the President Xi’s statement, 
China will dedicate $15 billion to boost industrial production in the 
region, $10 billion for joint energy projects and another $10 billion in 
soft loans, while together with the UAE and Qatar, China will also in-
vest $20 billion in conventional energy (Noueihed & Abdelaty). As part 
of this plan, China is planning to buy oil from the region and dedicate 
$300 million to help train the police (Noueihed & Abdelaty, 2016). 
The Egyptian president Sisi said for the press in 2014 that economic 
and military co-operation between China and Egypt reached unpreced-
ented levels (Noueihed & Abdelaty, 2016) and in the same interview, Xi 
explained that 32 Chinese companies were working in the Suez Canal 
economic zone and that the number will rise to 100 firms with $2.5 bil-
lion of investments (Noueihed & Abdelaty, 2016). He added that these 
two countries are planning to implement 15 projects in electricity, in-
frastructure and transport with investments that could total $15 billion 
(Noueihed & Abdelaty, 2016).
In 2015, China concluded 20 co-operation agreements with 
Pakistan worth $1.6 billion that Xinhua4 characterized as energy and 
power projects and education and healthcare. China also signed a $46 
billion agreement to build a port in Gwadar, Pakistan (Pakistan hands 
over 2000 acres to China in Gwadar port city, 2015). The goal of this 
project is to connect Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xinjiang with 
Gwadar. As part of the project China will finance ($1.65 billion) Ka-
rot hydropower project in Pakistan (Tiezzi, 2015e). China and Pakistan 
said that Gwadar Port, energy, transport infrastructure and industrial 
co-operation would be four key areas for co-operation (Tiezzi, 2015e).
Although still not so significant, China is also active in the Arctic. 
According to the research from 2015, the reserves in the Arctic have 
100 billion tons of fuel (oil and gas) and it is no wonder that it immedi-
ately attracted Chinese attention (Enormous Oil, Gas Reserves Found 
in Russia’s Arctic Region, 2015). China’s activities in the Arctic are 
primarily shaped by scientific and climate considerations, commercial 
interest in the petroleum, shipping and mineral sectors, as well as dip-
lomatic and legal concerns. China is still positioning itself in the Arctic 
4  Chinese news agency
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in order to get access to resources and take advantage of strategic, eco-
nomic, military, and scientific opportunities in the Arctic region (Kuo 
& Tang, 2015).
The above-mentioned projects clearly indicate that the OBOR initi-
ative, besides its initially planned routes, is constantly adding new con-
necting points, but also including projects in various fields that were not 
part of the original initiative. Therefore, it can be concluded that China’s 
vision of the OBOR initiative seems to be a bit different from just an 
economic belt. According to some analysts, it already looks more like 
an establishment of a political community that stretches from Asia to 
Europe and Africa and, according to Tiezzi (2014b), China is convinced 
that its principles will be the guiding force in this new community.
 
MILITARY INITIATIVE
 Although China is promoting non-intervention and non-interfer-
ence principles, it seems that Beijing in some cases digresses from this 
course. South China Sea dispute, alleged intervention in Syria, military 
agreements with Nepal and Egypt and the Djibouti military port are 
some of the examples of the Chinese non-alliance with its basic inter-
national affairs principles.
Although China supplied Assad with weapons in the past (Rudolf, 
2016), Beijing has managed to dodge the direct military intervention 
in Syria for some time (Payne, 2016). However, Beijing’s avoidance 
has also elicited accusations of free riding and ignoring a humanitarian 
disaster (Payne, 2016). As Payne (2016) points out, China’s policy of 
supporting Assad’s government as the legitimate authority in Syria is 
often criticized, but at least China is not regularly increasing its troops 
in Syria or trying to intensify the fight against ISIS. Instead, it is work-
ing to deepen economic relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, 
among others.
However, Beijing has started engaging with both the Syrian govern-
ment and opposition leaders in an effort to mediate the conflict. China’s 
new approach is based on a mix of geostrategic interests and the de-
sire to be seen as an influential actor on the stage of global diplomacy 
(Rudolf, 2016). China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted his Syrian 
counterpart Walid al-Moallem and shortly after this meeting his guest 
was Khaled Khoja, the president of the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Rudolf, 2016). 
In 2016, Israel accused China of sending troops to Syria but it is 
more likely that Beijing has dispatched military observers — with 
the approval of the Assad government — as it has done in Iraq before 
(Rudolf, 2016). It seems that because of the OBOR initiative Beijing’s 
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concern for the regional security is becoming stronger than its long-pro-
moted non-intervention and non-interference policy. In January 2016, 
China also sent an envoy to Iran and Saudi Arabia, calling on its oil 
suppliers to exercise restraint in their diplomatic clash (Rudolf, 2016). 
Prior to the Syrian intervention, in 2014, economic and military 
co-operation between China and Egypt reached unprecedented levels 
(Noueihed & Abdelaty, 2016) and in 2016, Nepal and China pledged to 
increase defense co-operation (Tiezzi, 2016c).
The Chinese military and diplomatic efforts can be perceived 
through the prism of the OBOR initiative but also through the rising 
issue with the Uighur people in Xinjiang province. As China extends 
its energy and mining activities in its western regions, especially in 
Xinjian province, Beijing will be forced to enhance regional security 
co-operation and tighten control over its borderlands (China’s Am-
bitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 2, 2013). A recent dispute 
between China and India over India’s decision to issue a visa to Uyghur 
activist Dolkun Isa shows how seriously Beijing treats the security is-
sue in its western regions but also how serious Beijing’s concerns ac-
tually are (Patranobis, 2016). The OBOR initiative is intended to help 
China get access to resources but also to solve security issues with the 
Muslim population in western China. Beijing wants to get support and 
collaborate with the governments of the Central and West Asian coun-
tries in order to keep this issue under control and tighten the security on 
its borders. This plan is also a way of avoiding a direct confrontation 
with the US rebalance in this region (Wang Z., 2015).
When it comes to the southern and eastern regions of Asia, China 
managed to form an economic partnership with its long-time adversary, 
Vietnam and is acting pretty aggressively in South China Sea, espe-
cially in the light of its failure to respond to Typhoon Haiyan in Philip-
pines5 (Chen, 2013).
In 2015, Beijing signed a 10-year agreement with Djibouti to set 
up a navy base for ships that would be engaged in anti-piracy opera-
tions off the coast of Yemen. This $100 million base would be based in 
the Obock region, from where an American outpost was evicted earlier 
the same year (Kleven, 2015). There are several reasons why China 
selected Djibouti for its naval base. According to Kleven, Djibouti is a 
fairly stable country at the strategic trade route linking the Suez Canal 
to the Indian Ocean and from this point the Chinese maritime patrol 
aircraft can cover most of the Arabian Peninsula and northern and cent-
ral Africa without refueling. Djibouti’s port can accommodate Chinese 
aircraft carriers and it is close to the base from which the US conducts 
5  IKEA, a Swedish furniture chain, gave more financial aid to the Philippines than China.
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drone strikes on al Shabaab and al-Qaeda targets (Kleven, 2015). 
This project in Jibouti, but also the South China Sea dispute stirred 
a lot of concern and criticism. According to Yale, despite the idealistic 
claims of “peaceful economic development absent political strings”, 
China continues its activities in the South China Sea, turning reefs into 
islands and constructing runways that could be used by the People’s 
Liberation Army. Also, taking into account the basis in Djibouti and the 
‘String of Pearls’ plan, it is no wonder that many Sinologists question 
the real intention of the OBOR initiative (Kleven, 2015). As some ana-
lysts explain, it could easily turn out to be a military ambition consist-
ing of a series of ports stretching from the South China Sea to Africa’s 
East Coast and looking into the Obock case it is almost certain that the 
militarization of Chinese-owned ports can happen elsewhere (Kleven, 
2015). An alleged Chinese submarine in Colombo in 2015, provoked 
rumors about the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Maldives, 
and Pakistan’s invitation for China to set up a naval base in Gwadar can 
be interpreted as indicators that the Chinese are actually not planning 
just to build commercial ports (Pitlo III, 2015).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
 This section of the paper presents a brief overview of the most 
important implications of the China’s global rise and provides an ana-
lysis of implications on several world regions. The implications can 
be divided into several categories: economic, military, human rights, 
world leadership and energy. A global economic threat is mostly due to 
the instability of the energy supply to China, which can start a domino 
effect and influence other countries around the world. The violation of 
human rights pertains mostly to the Chinese partnerships with corrupt 
governments in Africa and Asia. The world leadership issue reflects in 
the Chinese rising position in the world affairs and reduction of the US 
role in the world affairs but also in the potentially subordinate position 
of all the countries along the One Belt, One Road. The energy issue 
includes the rising Chinese demand for oil and gas and establishment of 
the global electricity network that can destabilize oil and gas markets 
and give China the monopoly over the world’s electricity supply.
The Middle East has for long been the China’s weak spot. The se-
curity and political situation in the entire region represents a serious 
threat to China’s energy security and, consequently, a threat to the sta-
bility of global markets. According to Daniels & Brown (2015), over 
one third of global oil demand growth in 2014 can be ascribed to China, 
which imports 60% of its oil, and the Middle Eastern crude oil accoun-
ted for over half of the total Chinese imports. In addition, China’s low 
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oil stockpile capacity is extremely vulnerable to any changes in the de-
mand (Hurst, 2006), while at the same time ISIS threatens to spread 
to the Central Asian regions that are key to the success of the OBOR 
initiative (Rudolf, 2015). China also has many issues with the Uighur 
people who are mostly Muslims in the Xinjiang province and who 
want their independence (Why is there tension between China and the 
Uighurs?, 2014). Tarim, the largest inland oil basin in China (Tarim 
Oilfield, 2004), is located in this province as well, which makes the en-
tire region extremely important to Beijing, especially if the OBOR land 
routes are taken into account.
China is also making attempts at establishing contacts along the 
Silk Road in order to develop productivity in each country (Tiezzi, 
2014b) and this initiative could bring multiple benefits to China: China 
will have to invest much less in the future in securing the trade routes, 
the security concerns will be reduced in case of incidents, China will 
have multiple allies directly involved in the security restoration process 
and the Chinese currency will eventually be used more than other cur-
rencies (Tiezzi, 2014b). As a matter of fact, China’s currency, the ren-
minbi, is already used in Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, 
and Thailand and it is only a matter of time when renminbi will be used 
in other countries along the Silk Road (Tiezzi, 2014b). One of the main 
reasons for the Russian unprecedented success in oil export to China in 
2015 is Moscow’s decision to accept the Chinese currency as the means 
of payment.
However, although the above-mentioned Chinese plans seem lo-
gical and beneficial for all the parties involved, there is a rising con-
cern in surrounding countries that China’s pursuit of its own national 
interests could harm them and consequently they have adopted a dual 
strategy of relying on China economically and on the U.S. for security 
(Li & Yanzhuo, 2015).
Another important issue in China is electricity, especially in the 
western regions of China. Beijing has been making attempts at solving 
this issue for quite a while and State Grid chairman Liu Zhenya outlined 
a $50 trillion plan to create a world electricity network that heavily 
incorporates wind energy from the Arctic and solar energy from the 
Equator regions (Spegele, 2016). As the report states the project could 
come on line by 2050, but the State Grid wants to begin pilot projects 
within the next 10 years (Spegele, 2016). As mentioned above, despite 
the fact that this grid would facilitate the Chinese initiatives along the 
OBOR routes, this project could also give China a certain monopol-
istic position over the governments around the world and significantly 
change the existing policies regarding the electricity supply.
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The following paragraphs present some of the implications of the 
Chinese growth on the various regions around the world.
China’s engagement in oil production and investment in high risk 
countries of Africa could add new capacity to the world’s strained en-
ergy market and additionally drive the prices down. Also, without the 
investments, technology and expertise that China brings to Africa, some 
of the countries would be unable to realize the financial gain from oil 
within their boundaries (Hurst, 2006). However, China’s involvement 
in some of the African countries could contribute to instability by fur-
ther enabling these countries to violate human rights (e.g. Talisman’s 
oil revenues paid to the Sudanese government were used to buy arms to 
fight the civil war) and continue corrupt activities (Hurst, 2006). Taking 
into account China’s policy of not interfering with another country’s in-
ternal affairs, China’s growing influence in Africa is counter-productive 
to western objectives of promoting human rights and abolishing cor-
ruption. Doing business with the Chinese companies does not require 
the same ethical conditions as Western companies, whose activities are 
monitored by non-governmental organizations and shareholders (Hurst, 
2006). 
Over the past decade, Beijing has been extensively working on 
strengthening diplomatic ties with many countries in Africa and, as 
the number of geological evidence of oil increases, China is becoming 
more active in this part of the world. In this sense, Angola has already 
established itself as one of the top Chinese exporters of crude oil and 
the export to China was 13% of the total amount of oil China imported 
in 2014, which is 2% more than Russia (Cunningham, 2015).
China is also emphasizing historical links between the African con-
tinent and China in order to meet its own economic objectives. The 
frequency of visits by the Chinese officials to Africa has increased sig-
nificantly over the past few years and Beijing is promoted as a reli-
able partner that is not interested in lecturing Africa on human rights, 
governance and corruption (Hurst, 2006). As a result, Chinese mobile 
providers in Africa achieved 475 million users in 2013 (Wong, 2015), 
the total trade between China and Africa from 2000 to 2012 rose to 
US$198.49 billion (Brautigam, 2013) and countries like Angola and 
Nigeria are becoming important Chinese oil exporters. 
Former Chinese president, Hu Jintao, promoted a three-point pro-
posal on friendly relations, common prosperity and closer co-operation 
between China and Africa in order to strengthen bilateral ties between 
China and Africa. The President claimed that no political strings were 
involved or implied, and added that China and Africa should co-oper-
ate more closely on an international level to safeguard the rights and 
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interests of developing countries (Hurst, 2006). However, although 
President Hu denied political background of the Chinese efforts, his 
statement can be interpreted as a demand for the African support for the 
Chinese expansion in Africa by presenting the investment projects as 
their common interest. 
Since 2013, South-East Asia has increasingly looked to China as its 
main trading partner and America as the prime guarantor of its security. 
However, there is an increasing perception that power in the region is 
shifting (Relations with South-East Asia, 2013).
Central Asia and Pakistan have for long been strategic Chinese 
partners. After Xi Jinping’s visit to the Central Asian republics in 2013, 
energy deals were quickly signed with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan (Romanowski, 2014) and, according to Tiezzi 
(2016b), in 2016 China started a new hydro-power plant project on the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which also includes the 
world’s largest solar plant in Punjab Province and the $10 billion ex-
pansion of the Karachi nuclear power plant. The entire CPEC consists 
of 21 energy projects and China has already committed $6.5 billion to 
build a new nuclear power plant in Karachi (Tiezzi, 2014a). 
Beijing is also paying more attention to the ASEAN6 partners. 
China has a comparative advantage regarding historic, geographic, and 
geo-economic terms, and it has also been ASEAN’s largest trading part-
ner for six consecutive years since the bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) was launched in 2010 (in 2014, bilateral trade was over $480 
billion and total Chinese FDI in ASEAN was about $400 billion) (Ting, 
2016). Chinese President Xi also invested significant efforts to mend 
China’s image in the Southeast Asian states – many of which have con-
cerns over China’s actions in the South China Sea (Tiezzi, 2015a). As 
Tiezzi explained, China and Singapore7 agreed to reframe their rela-
tionship as “a partnership of all-round co-operation keeping with the 
times.” President Xi proposed a vision of Asian relations which is based 
on a common sense of Asian identity. “We should never let animosity 
divide us,” Xi said. Xi has made similar calls for Asian unity before, 
but admitted in this talk that security issues remain “very complicated” 
(Tiezzi, 2015a). 
China and ASEAN have started talking about upgrading their bilat-
eral FTA (Ting, 2016). Over the past two years their relationship was 
pretty fruitful, especially in the China-Indochina Economic Corridor, 
with advances in several projects such as the China-Thailand Railway, 
6  ASEAN, a grouping of 10 Southeast Asian states that collectively are the third-largest economy 
in Asia and the seventh-largest in the world (http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/u-s-upgrad-
ing-economic-ties-with-asean-amid-chinas-growing-influence/)
7  Singapore is currently the coordinator for China-ASEAN relations.
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China-Laos Railway, the new Lancang-Mekong Dialogue, Two Cor-
ridors Plus One Circle Initiative between China and Vietnam, and the 
China-Singapore Government-to-Government Project in Chongqing 
(Ting, 2016).
The major issue for China-ASEAN relations at the moment is the 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the islands claimed in 
part or in whole by China and Taiwan as well as four ASEAN members: 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Tiezzi, 2016a). Over 
the past few years the South China Sea issue has developed in three 
ways: the balance between great powers (mainly China and the US), 
the relationship between China and ASEAN, and the disputes between 
China and ASEAN claimant states. Currently, the ASEAN claimants 
are behind the scenes while the US is in the center of the stage (Li 
& Yanzhuo, 2016). However, China’s ties with the members of the 
ASEAN remain stable and bilateral co-operation will likely deepen in 
the coming years (Li & Yanzhuo, 2016). An upgraded version of the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement was signed in November, 2015 
(Li & Yanzhuo, 2016). It seems that Beijing does not intend to escal-
ate the disputes, as it might impact the implementation of the OBOR 
strategy, especially the Maritime Silk Road in Southeast Asia (Li & 
Yanzhuo, 2016). China is well aware of this danger and Beijing will 
probably employ diplomatic efforts to tone down the current tensions 
with the ASEAN claimants and the US. 
During the course of 15 years since China’s accession to the WTO 
the trade between the EU and China have expanded substantially. 
European populists have used the EU’s rising trade deficit with China 
to accuse Beijing of mercantilism and unfair trade tactics, deliberately 
excluding reference to the EU’s record exports to China, which have 
created millions of jobs and promoted European welfare. They refused 
to acknowledge China’s support for the EU during the Eurozone crisis, 
which took the form of direct investments and portfolio investments 
in sovereign bonds of the EU states under economic distress (Zhiqin, 
2016). 
According to Tiezzi (2015b), in 2016 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
hosted 16 European leaders in Suhzou for the fourth China-Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) summit (first time in China) which brings to-
gether leaders from China and 16 Central and Eastern European states: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Central and Eastern Europe will play a crucial role in making sure 
China’s ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ reaches its final destination - West-
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ern Europe (Tiezzi, 2015b). Although the EU membership of the 11 
CEE countries (formerly Communist countries and now EZ member 
states) has certainly complicated the co-operation framework in terms 
of restrictive EU legislation, the leadership in Beijing has not given up 
on the idea of these states becoming ‘lobbyists’ for Chinese interests 
within specific EU institutions (Filippova & Veleva, 2015). 
China is also making a bid to help construct railways, roads, and 
ports in Europe and signed deals with both Hungary and Serbia to build 
a high-speed rail line between their capitals, Budapest and Belgrade 
(Tiezzi, 2015b). 
Chinese Premier Li also announced that China will invest in con-
structing and upgrading port facilities in the Baltic, Adriatic and Black 
Seas, adding that Croatia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia and Bulgaria have 
proposed to strengthen co-operation on port development (Tiezzi, 
2015b). Slovakia expressed its interest in gas pipelines and infrastruc-
ture projects (Tiezzi, 2015b).
States like Germany, the UK and the Netherlands managed to ex-
pand their trade with China substantially, while more labor-intensive 
EU states saw their global market shares and GDP falter (Zhiqin, 2016). 
Very few Europeans acknowledge that China has also saved the EU and 
the world from the US Internet monopoly (Zhiqin, 2016). In the coming 
years and in the light of a number of projects in various sectors in ECC, 
the Chinese presence and influence over some of the EU decisions are 
expected to rise.
In the light of many territorial disputes since 1962 between China 
and India (Markey, 2015), it is necessary to clarify that there is no con-
tradiction between India’s strengthening its ties with the US while also 
having a reasonable and open relationship with China (Maini, 2016). 
Due to increasing potential interests in the OBOR benefits, India is very 
likely to start working on the establishment of even closer ties with 
China, especially providing that both countries are BRICS member 
states.
Although many analysts view the India-China relationship through 
the prism of security issues and territorial disputes, both countries 
are now trying to find common ground in a number of areas (Maini, 
2016). Recently, both countries seem to have made some progress on 
the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, which is an 
important part of China’s One Belt, One Road project (Maini, 2016). 
India’s trade with China, as a proportion of India’s trade with all coun-
tries, was only 0.2 percent in 1991-92 but rose to 8.7 percent in 2013-14 
and since 2008 China has also surpassed the U.S. as India’s largest trad-
ing partner (Bai, 2015). In 2013-14, India’s imports from China were 
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valued at $510 billion, whereas its exports to China amounted to $150 
billion (Bai, 2015). 
India is now seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with which 
it did not have previous links (Maini, 2016). And there are other sig-
nificant reasons to anticipate greater co-operation between China and 
India. Sino-Indian collaboration in new multilateral settings – such as 
the BRICS summits, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organization – has the potential to grow deeper 
and more significant over time (Markey, 2015). 
As a result of the late January 2015 summit between President 
Obama and Prime Minister Modi Beijing begun to show a willingness 
to urgently discuss the resolution of its 4057 km contested border with 
India. A flurry of statements and opinions that have been released in 
China, discussing a possible resolution to the 60-year-old dispute, sug-
gest changing mindsets in Beijing (Gokhale, 2015). After meeting Modi 
at the BRICS summit (Modi was recognized as a strong leader to nego-
tiate issues by China), President Xi Jinping became the first leader of a 
P-5 nation to make a trip to India in September 2014 (Gokhale, 2015).
On the other hand, due to India’s increasing role in Southeast Asia, 
specifically in the South China Sea, many analysts believe that this 
might be a pressure on their relationship (Maini, 2016). Many strategic 
analysts in India also believe that China is encircling India and often 
refer to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to support their 
claims (Maini, 2016). Both countries actively pursue closer ties with 
each other’s traditional adversaries: China with Pakistan and India with 
Japan. Additionally, as India and China build increasingly capable and 
expeditionary military forces, their areas of operation will overlap more 
frequently (Markey, 2015), which may present another security issue. 
However, Markey (2015) believes that, although conflict and co-op-
eration are not mutually exclusive in international relationships, the 
most plausible future scenario is one in which New Delhi and Beijing 
deepen their commercial ties and co-operate in areas of mutual interest, 
while remaining distrustful of each other’s intentions to warrant dip-
lomatic and military hedging. Besides economic and energy plans that 
China promotes with the OBOR initiative, there is also an important 
element of the Chinese international development – culture. 
The Silk Road incentive for cultural sector co-operation, that star-
ted with the first successful Silk Road world heritage listing in 2014 at a 
Unesco’s annual world heritage meeting, could easily become the most 
ambitious and expansive international co-operation program for herit-
age preservation ever undertaken. The total number of sites that could 
be included in this program is more than 500 (Winter, 2016). 
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According to Wang Z, the integration of Asia will not work itself 
out only through railroads, highways and pipelines; it will also depend 
on whether Asian countries can build common identity and values 
(Wang, 2015). Junjie (2015) explains as well that what should be taken 
into account regarding the grand strategy of the OBOR initiative is not 
only trade or closer diplomatic ties with neighboring countries but the 
market for ideas. 
According to Polk (2014), China has spent considerable time and 
energy in the Gulf States promoting soft power and Beijing provided a 
lot of no-strings funding and scholarships for students, CCTV station 
to broadcast news in Arabic and established Confucius centers aimed 
at framing how the youth see China. Recent polls showed that 23% of 
Arabs see China8 as the preferred global superpower (Polk, 2014). 
When it comes to economy, it is important to point out that the 
Chinese trade in the Middle East grew significantly from 2000 to 2014. 
China achieved 30% annual trade growth rate with Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, 26% with the UAE and Iraq, and 28% with Iran, while the 
US trade with the Gulf is declining (Polk, 2014). This shows that the 
Chinese diplomatic and economic efforts have been very serious and 
that even the USA, a long-time economic partner of the Middle East, 
does not seem to be able to follow China.
Polk (2014) points out that Saudi Arabia increased oil exports to 
China in 2009 and awarded Chinese companies several major projects 
on healthcare, energy exploration, mining, and railroad construction 
($2 billion) and King Abdullah’s first state visit after ascending to the 
throne was to China. In February 2016, Saudi Arabia took over the 
leading China’s top oil exporter position from Russia (Holodny, 2016) 
and due to this fact Beijing pays a lot more attention to the security in 
the Middle Eastern regions. The Chinese security efforts are mostly 
focused on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which 
have close diplomatic and economic relations with China. 
Another important Chinese partner in this region is Iran. Accord-
ing to Al-Jazeera, China imports from Iran 10-15% of its energy needs 
and the two countries agreed in 2016 to expand their trade from $52bn 
in 2014 to $600bn over the next ten years (West-wary Iran deepens 
China ties as sanctions end, 2016). Previously, Iran awarded telecom-
munications contracts and constructions projects to Chinese companies 
(Polk, 2014), as well as certain highway construction (China Commu-
nications Construction to build Iran’s North Highway project, 2015). 
As Ayatollah pointed out at a meeting with the Chinese officials in 2016 
(West-wary Iran deepens China ties as sanctions end, 2016), Westerners 
8  On the other hand, only 7% of Arabs see the USA as the preferred global superpower.
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have never obtained the trust of the Iranian nation, which led to closer 
diplomatic ties with China. On this occasion Iran and China signed 17 
documents to broaden bilateral co-operation in energy, industry, trans-
portation, railways, ports, new technology, tourism and the environ-
ment (West-wary Iran deepens China ties as sanctions end, 2016). This 
bilateral agreement, as well as previous Chinese diplomatic efforts, is 
a clear sign that China is becoming a significant actor in the Middle 
East, especially if we take into account that the two countries agreed to 
co-operate on terrorism and extremism in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and 
Yemen (West-wary Iran deepens China ties as sanctions end, 2016).
China’s relations with Russia are rather complex and, according to 
Eder (2014), Russia perceives China in Central Asia in a way as the EU 
in case of Ukraine, while on the other hand, China perceives Russia as 
an unreliable partner in opposing the American unipolarity. However, 
both China and Russia are well aware of the importance of stable and 
friendly relations with each other. Also, both countries are BRICS mem-
ber states and want to reduce the US presence and influence in Asia.
Skalamera (2015) claims that Russia does not have advanced tech-
nology to reach its oil deposits in the Arctic and Eastern Siberia and al-
though the Chinese companies are technologically not too much ahead 
of Russians they can help them develop less complex projects such as 
those in Western Siberia. However, such projects may put Russia in 
a position of China’s resource appendage and, if the oil prices on the 
global level do not recover soon, Russia can become China’s energy 
resource satellite state (Skalamera, 2015). Beijing’s growing influence 
in Central Asia undermines an important Russian objective, that is, the 
monopolistic position among the Chinese Central Asian suppliers (Kuo 
& Tang, 2015).
When it comes to the relations between China and the USA, the 
Council on Foreign Relations published a report in which they stated 
that “No relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as 
the one between the United States, the world’s great power, and China, 
the world’s rising power“ (Hills, Blair, & Jannuzi, 2007, p. xi). In 2007, 
the United States and China had a relationship that was truly unimagin-
able two generations ago (Hills, Blair, & Jannuzi, 2007). However, tak-
ing into account that the US and China are structurally inclined toward 
disagreement in maritime disputes (Webster, 2015), it is no wonder that 
China’s rapid economic development accompanied by an enormous 
and growing trade surplus with the United States, expanding economic 
and political influence in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
Latin America, modernization of its military and a two-decade military 
budget growth and a robust space program have caused a lot of concern 
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on the US part recently (Hills, Blair, & Jannuzi, 2007).
For the past three decades the U.S. policy toward China remained 
rooted in the strategic interests commonly known as ‘engagement’ and 
through this policy China’s relationship with the United States was 
transformed from near-constant antagonism to dialogue and co-opera-
tion (Hills, Blair, & Jannuzi, 2007). However, the geopolitical terrain, 
altered by the emergence of China as one of the major powers, is chan-
ging and, as China’s economic and military power grows, there is con-
siderable uncertainty about its future course (Hills, Blair, & Jannuzi, 
2007).
On the other hand, it seems that the election year in the US slowed 
down its diplomatic efforts abroad. A new president in the office will 
tailor the US-China relations over the next four years and one of the 
presidential candidates, Donald Trump, is planning to change relations 
between the two countries radically. He will mostly focus on three ma-
jor issues - trade, security and global leadership. Trump’s isolationist 
foreign policy may pull the US out of its current commitments in inter-
national governance, such as the United Nations, which could in turn 
give China the opportunity to transform itself into a ‘game maker’ from 
the current position of a ‘player’ (Qiu, 2016). Trump is also planning to 
bring millions of manufacturing jobs back to the United States and he 
suggested levying a 45% tariff on Chinese products, in order to ensure 
a level playing for American workers (Qiu, 2016). This plan could force 
the US companies to leave emerging markets such as China, which 
would create market vacuum that would Chinese companies continue 
filling at an even faster rate (Qiu, 2016). 
Trump’s plan to withdraw from NATO would probably additionally 
destabilize Europe and accelerate current growing momentum of the 
right-wing parties which could, led by protectionism, seriously threaten 
China’s business interests in Europe (Qiu, 2016). His position with the 
UN might give Beijing the opportunity to assume leadership on this 
platform as well (Qiu, 2016).
A widely discussed study by the Council on Foreign Relations sug-
gests that the US should chose ‘preeminence’ over ‘predominance’ re-
garding China (Webster, 2015) but in case of Trump this option might 
not be available. If anything is clear now regarding the US-China rela-
tions over the next four years, it is a widely spread certainty among the 
analysts that a very turbulent era in the US-China relations is coming.
CONCLUSION
     Although some authors might claim that China in its reposition-
ing battle with Russia actually contributes to the re-establishment of the 
US unipolarity, over the past 20 years China has definitely reduced the 
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US dominance around the world. The Chinese international efforts so 
far have been different from the US but military interventions in Syria 
and South China Sea are indicators that they could not be based on eco-
nomic, investment and energy ties only. 
As the previous chapters showed, it would be pretty naïve to view 
the Chinese initiatives through the prism of energy security and trade 
alone. China is not only investing in the OBOR initiative but also in 
the local networks, economy and energy sector, as well as in security, 
healthcare and education. Besides the OBOR initiative, China is also 
developing foreign markets, preparing them for future ‘consumption’. 
It is very obvious that China is strengthening its diplomatic ties with 
many countries and the most surprising are its large-scale investment 
projects in Africa. 
China used vacuum of power – many Western companies withdrew 
from Africa because of high pressure from NGOs because of violation 
of human rights – in order to establish itself and use infrastructure built 
by the West.
The analysis shows that the OBOR initiative is not only a pro-
ject of connecting China with the rest of Asia, Africa and Europe, as 
presented by Beijing, but also a wider geo-strategic plan to establish the 
dominant diplomatic position of China in many regions of the world. 
Chinese efforts to establish a political route for its NOCs with host 
governments raise suspicions that energy security is just a sub-compon-
ent of a broader Chinese geo-strategy. Additionally, there is already a 
widespread fear that the Chinese upstream acquisitions can lock up oil 
supplies and distort international oil markets to the detriment of other 
economies. 
Beijing’s energy security plans and the OBOR initiative are tightly 
connected with its investments and economic development. The Silk 
Road initiative is supported by the oil, gas and economic initiatives 
and in this way the security of the Chinese development plans is guar-
anteed not only by China but also by all the countries that have at least 
some benefit from the Chinese projects. In this sense, every country 
is important and the best example of such a coordinated effort are the 
Caspian region and Africa. 
China is also aware that economic and social interdependence and 
stability are the key to security and an uninterrupted economic growth 
and trade. A stable economy and a win-win situation have so far been 
used as a unifying factor by China. Beijing invests in ports, roads and 
railways and uses culture and various diplomatic efforts to strengthen 
the OBOR initiative. China is now trying to strengthen its historic ties 
with the nations along the OBOR routes and has already invested a bil-
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lion out of planned trillions of dollars in various projects, from health-
care, education and search for the remains of Zheng He’s fleet to mu-
seums, energy and security. China is trying to translate its investments 
and trade into building a coalition of states that align their values and 
foreign policies with those of China at the expense of competitors like 
the United States (China’s Maritime Silk Road Gamble). If this was 
achieved, Chinese security and dominance over many regions without 
using their own resources would be almost guaranteed and the OBOR 
initiative would not only be the Chinese interest but the interest of all 
the states that benefit from this and other Chinese initiatives. It would 
also secure China’s leadership position and facilitate the Chinese plan 
to connect East Asia and Western Europe. Beijing, by helping its new 
‘allies’ get stronger, is now building a kind of new super bloc that soon 
might be able to serve as a counterbalance to NATO but also to many 
other economic unions. 
In the end, the answer to the question who benefits from the Chinese 
expansion might sound naive but, taking into account the current situ-
ation in many countries along the OBOR routes, it seems that the an-
swer is everybody. The only issue that countries joining the OBOR and 
other Chinese initiatives could face in the future is that whether, by 
seeking to escape the grip of one superpower, they only fell into the grip 
of another – China.
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